The Handbook of International Trade and Finance The Complete Guide to Risk Management International Payments and Currency Management Bonds and Guarantees Credit Insurance and Trade Finance.pdf
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1、 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 University of Berkshire Hathaway A = Please Support This Work by Leaving an Amazon Review Please Support This Work by Leaving an Amazon Review 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
2、18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 University of Berkshire Hathaway A 30 Years of Lessons Learned from Warren Buffett Ive become a bass fi sherman in my old age. But in my lake, they do better with walleye at night.” Author Timothy Ferriss said, “As several veter
3、ans put it to me before the pilgrimage, Its like an MBA in a weekend. I thought this was hyperbole and hero worship, but I would now take it further: I think its one weekend that delivers more than most MBAs. Real-world strategies culled from experience? Check. Networking? Big-time check. The only t
4、hing the mecca of Buffett seemed to lack was the $100K+ price tag.” Please Support This Work by Leaving an Amazon Review I N T R O D U C T I O N xvi 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 terrifi ed of public speakin
5、g. (He used to get physically ill at just the thought of it.) Thankfully, over the years, Buffett and Munger have grown ever- more comfortable as educators. Today, they are excellent teachers. Their wisdom and willingness to share make each annual meeting an invaluable installment in a sublime lectu
6、re series. The Unstoppable Rise of Berkshire Hathaway Few on Wall Street would dispute the claim that Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger are the greatest investors of our time. Their genius in identifying and evaluating intangibles sets them apart. As a value investor, your ideal situation is to fi n
7、d a company increasing its intrinsic value. Ideally, the company would be one with a declining stock price, thus creating an even better bargain as time unfolds. No one has employed these principles more effectively than Buffett and Munger. Over the last 50 years, they have consistently sought to ow
8、n either all or part of good businesses, bought at bargain prices. In addition, to succeed using this approach, one must control ones emotions. Buffett and Mungers are set apart by their mastery at business valuation and relentless rationality in implementing this approach. The results of this have
9、been awe-inspiring. Under Buffett and Mungers leadership, Berkshire Hathaway has be- come one of the greatest business stories of the 20th and 21st centuries. A Short History Buffett was educated at the University of Nebraska. Afterward, he enrolled at Columbia Business School. He went there to lear
10、n from the father of value investing, Benjamin Graham. Buffett became Grahams star student. Afterward, Graham took him on at his investment partnership, Graham Newman. Buffett used what he learned from that experience to start his own partnership back in Omaha. He did phenomenally well from the very
11、 beginning. A $10,000 investment in his partnership in 1956 grew to $200,000 by 1969. Thats a 25.9% compounded annualized return. Incredibly, the partnership never had a down year, even though the market had six down years during that period. In 1959, Buffett met Charlie Munger, who was also from Om
12、aha, at a dinner party. Each man instantly recognized the intelligence of the Please Support This Work by Leaving an Amazon Review 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 I N T R O D U C T I O N xvii other. Munger had worked i
13、n law, but Buffett convinced him that he should be in the investment business if he wanted to make real money.* Munger started his own investment partnership, Wheeler, Munger I was surprised by the price. Berkshire then had 1,583,680 shares outstanding. About 7% of these were owned by Buffett Partne
14、rship Ltd. (“BPL”), an investing entity that I managed and in which I had virtu- ally all of my net worth. Shortly before the tender offer was mailed, Stanton had asked me at what price BPL would sell its holdings. I answered $11.50, and he said, “Fine, we have a deal.” Then came Berkshires letter,
15、offering an eighth of a point less. I bristled at Stantons behavior and didnt tender. That was a monumentally stupid decision. Berkshire was then a northern textile manufacturer, mired in a terrible business. The industry in which it operated Please Support This Work by Leaving an Amazon Review A P
16、P E N D I X I : I N T H E B E G I N N I N G . . . 286 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 was heading south, both metaphorically and physically. And Berkshire, for a variety of reasons, was unable to change course
17、.”* “That was true even though the industrys problems had long been widely understood. Berkshires own Board minutes of July 29, 1954, laid out the grim facts: The textile industry in New England started going out of business forty years ago. During the war years this trend was stopped. The trend mus
18、t continue until supply and demand have been balanced. About a year after that board meeting, Berkshire Fine Spinning Associates and Hathaway Manufacturingboth with roots in the 19th Centuryjoined forces, taking the name we bear today. With its fourteen plants and 10,000 employees, the merged compan
19、y became the giant of New England textiles. What the two managements viewed as a merger agreement, however, soon morphed into a suicide pact. During the seven years following the consolidation, Berkshire operated at an overall loss, and its net worth shrunk by 37%. Meanwhile, the company closed nine
20、 plants, sometimes using the liquidation process to repurchase shares. And that pattern caught my attention. I purchase BPLs fi rst shares of Berkshire in December 1962, anticipating more closings and more repurchases. The stock was then selling for $7.50, a wide discount from per- share working cap
21、ital of $10.25 and book value of $20.20. Buying the stock at that price was like picking up a discarded cigar butt that had one puff remaining in it. Though the stub might be ugly and soggy, the puff would be free. Once that momentary pleasure was enjoyed, however, no more could be expected. Berkshi
22、re thereafter stuck to the script: It soon closed another two plants, and in that May 1964 move, set out to repurchase shares with the shutdown proceeds. The price that Stanton offered was 50% above the cost of our original purchases. There it wasmy free puff, just waiting for me, after which I coul
23、d look elsewhere for other discarded butts. * Charlie Munger once referred to textiles as “congealed electricity,” so the move of pro- duction to the TVA southern states was inevitable. In his classically understated way, he con- cluded that the New England textile business was a “totally doomed, ce
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