1、Conflict, Sanctions and the Future of World TradeW H I T E P A P E RM A Y 2 0 2 2Global Future Council on Trade and Investment每日免费获取报告1、每日微信群内分享7+最新重磅报告；2、每日分享当日华尔街日报、金融时报；3、每周分享经济学人4、行研报告均为公开版，权利归原作者所有，起点财经仅分发做内部学习。扫一扫二维码关注公号回复：研究报告加入“起点财经”微信群。 ContentsExecutive summaryIntroduction1 What next for w
2、orld commerce? Five scenarios1.1 Scenario 1: Russia shunned1.2 Scenario 2: Rehabilitation, eventually1.3 Scenario 3: Reactive fragmentation1.4 Scenario 4: Depth between allies1.5 Scenario 5: Beggar non-allies2 Ignore the siren song of the early GATT years2.1 Reason 1: A different starting point toda
3、ys geostrategic rivals are economically interdependent2.2 Reason 2: That trade can be weaponized is a reason for engagement, not decoupling2.3 Reason 3: Trust and restraint have been eroded among alliesContributorsEndnotes34556667101010111213Cover: Gettyimage/cinoby Inside: Gettyimage/TommLDisclaime
4、r This document is published by the World Economic Forum as a contribution to a project, insight area or interaction. The findings, interpretations and conclusions expressed herein are a result of a collaborative process facilitated and endorsed by the World Economic Forum but whose results do not n
5、ecessarily represent the views of the World Economic Forum, nor the entirety of its Members, Partners or other stakeholders. 2022 World Economic Forum. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, including photocopying and recording,
6、 or by any information storage and retrieval system.Conflict, Sanctions and the Future of World Trade2Executive summaryGeopolitical tensions raise questions about the future of the multilateral trading system.The Russian invasion of Ukraine has been met with unprecedented trade and other economic sa
7、nctions. Some members of the World Trade Organization (WTO), including the United States, the European Union (EU), Japan and Canada, have revoked the most-favoured-nation (MFN) status granted to Russia under WTO rules. This allows them to raise tariffs and other barriers against Russian imports. Tra
8、de negotiations at the WTO involving Russia are faltering. Heightened geopolitical tensions raise questions about the consequences for the global trading system. Five scenarios have been identified and explored in this paper for the benefit of business and government leaders navigating an increasing
9、ly uncertain landscape. Russia shunned: Trade sanctions are confined to Russia and Belarus. Temporary tariff increases and export bans against Russia could be extended if the conflict continues. More multinational enterprises (MNEs) suspend or divest their investments and operations in Russia. Rehab
10、ilitation, eventually: In the event of a credible ceasefire, a pathway to rehabilitate Russia could be created and the risk of further fragmentation of the world trading system could be reduced. Far-sighted WTO members could explore an enhanced role for the organization in addressing trade tensions.
11、 Reactive fragmentation: Should other WTO members be found to be providing material support to Russia, they, too, may become subject to trade sanctions, leading to further fragmentation of the world trading system. Depth between allies: Deeper economic integration among allies may occur where there
12、is a willingness to undertake reforms and develop common rules; for instance, on the digital economy or tackling climate change. Beggar non-allies: A group of like-minded WTO members decides to extend trade cooperation only to countries that embody the values of the liberal international economic or
13、der. Traditional MFN privileges are revoked for other countries.Returning to a trading world composed of competing blocs with tenuous links between them would be a flawed strategy given that todays geostrategic rivals are so economically interdependent, with much product innovation occurring collabo
14、ratively among firms located in different nations. Furthermore, the economic costs of ending commercial ties with countries outside these blocs would be high, while the benefits of expected governance and market reforms by bloc members are unclear. As such, where trade sanctions are imposed on natio
15、nal security grounds, they should be limited to the most egregious violations of international law. Understanding the triggers for, and consequences of, the scenarios identified informs strategic planning and, ultimately, decision-making.Conflict, Sanctions and the Future of World Trade3Introduction
16、The threat to Ukraines future posed by Russias actions raises the question of how this military conflict will affect trade relations going forward. Will trade sanctions spread? Could the world economy fragment into blocs of like-minded nations? Where would this leave the WTO? This paper delineates t
17、he strategic options that lie ahead and their likely consequences, thereby highlighting what is at stake for governments and companies in the near to medium term. By one count, in the six weeks following the invasion of Ukraine, a total of 87 trade and other sanctions1 were taken against Russia, and
18、 Moscow issued 13 counter-sanctions.2 The G7 and EU announced their intention to revoke the most favoured nation (MFN) status on Russian exports, among other steps, including the most far-reaching financial sanctions ever imposed on a G20 member.3 Many more governments have not picked sides and, des
19、pite pleas to the contrary, others will not disavow Russia. The fallout from the conflict and from ensuing sanctions and counter-sanctions has spread far generating palpable fears in dozens of countries about food security, energy supplies, supply-chain bottlenecks and production stoppages, and furt
20、her social and economic disruption. There is a growing sense that we are living through a defining moment in world trade and its governance. Leading investors, such as Larry Fink4 and Howard Marks,5 contend that the current phase of globalization is over. The recriminations over the joint revocation
21、 of Russias MFN status reveal sharp divisions among governments, which in turn will likely affect the future trajectory of the world trading system (as will be evident in the scenarios outlined later in this paper). The rationale for, frequency of resort to, and implementation details of trade sanct
22、ions imposed on national security grounds are contested not, it should be added, the right to invoke security exceptions. Defenders of revocation contend that when a nation invades another sovereign state it violates international law and should forfeit most of the benefits of its WTO membership. So
23、me go further and argue that, in the future, trade relations should be conditional on shared approaches to governance. Others note that the multilateral trading system was not designed to cope with military conflicts and this is why national security exceptions were created in the first place. In th
24、is view, “trading with the enemy” can be suspended during conflicts. That the March 2022 tariff hikes on Russian goods followed decisions in recent years by India,6 Russia,7 Saudi Arabia8 and the US9 to obstruct trade on national security grounds has led others to worry that these exceptions are bei
25、ng invoked too often. The sense here is that restraint and proportionality have been lost. A more forceful critique deplores what it sees as the politicization of trade sanctions, and double standards, on the part of Western nations. From this position, WTO members were not asked to sign up to certa
26、in, allegedly universal, values when they acceded the organization and “the West” should not demand that other members do so now. Such considerations cast doubt over the legitimacy of the MFN revocations, a view not confined to the Russian delegation. Combined with concerns about the rising price of
27、 and availability of key minerals and commodities, higher price inflation at home, as well as keen interest in how the military conflict unfolds in Ukraine, these diplomatic divisions form the backdrop against which governments will make potentially far-reaching decisions about national trade polici
28、es in the months ahead. Those decisions unilateral or joint will shape the global business environment in ways that are likely to have first-order implications for data, investment and trade flows and for the management of overseas subsidiaries in the years to come.Military conflict and economic san
29、ctions are having profound effects on the global trading system.Conflict, Sanctions and the Future of World Trade4What next for world commerce? Five scenariosFive scenarios emerge in the context of heightened geopolitical tensions.1Commercial policy relations between nations are governed by an intri
30、cate web of intergovernmental agreements bilateral, regional and global. Significant shifts in the outcomes of commercial policy will almost certainly affect the means deployed. Threats to security be they related to territorial integrity, energy, food or other goods and services deemed essential ca
31、n scramble trade and investment policy priorities. Traditional working assumptions are called into question. Coming on top of growing geopolitical rivalry, the military conflict in Ukraine may accelerate the adoption of new forms of economic statecraft.Although regional trade agreements are the acce
32、pted vehicle for favouring some trading partners over others, it has always been understood that the treatment codified at the WTO offered guarantees of a minimum and often generous treatment. Remove that minimum and the gaps between favoured and disfavoured trading partners can widen sharply. Centr
33、al to the five scenarios that follow are decisions on whether to continue to respect those minimum guarantees of treatment or to privilege some trading partners over others and on what terms. The scenarios are outlined below, starting with the one closest to the current state of play in the WTO.Whil
34、e revoking the MFN treatment of Russias exports was a major step, it reflects a clear decision by the sanctioning nations that the benefits of the WTO cannot be fully enjoyed by a member that violates the territorial integrity of another sovereign state. However, any desire to punish Russia has not
35、translated into attempts to eject that nation from the WTO. This suggests that even the sanctioning nations do not want to weaken the WTO by seeing a G20 member leave the organization. Should the conflict continue, this scenario allows for extensions of temporary tariff increases and export bans on
36、trade with Russia. Sanctions on Russia could even be ratcheted up, should that be deemed necessary. Under these circumstances, more multinationals would suspend or even divest their operations in Russia. Other companies would cease trading with their Russian counterparts. What is central to this sce
37、nario is that the trade sanctions are confined to Russia (and to Belarus, which is not a member of the WTO). Certain trade routes are disrupted, but the MFN principle continues to apply to most international trade. In short, there is some fragmentation and systemic damage, but it is probably managea
38、ble. 1.1 Scenario 1: Russia shunnedConflict, Sanctions and the Future of World Trade51.3 Scenario 3: Reactive fragmentationWhile a credible ceasefire was the trigger for the second scenario, the trigger for the third is the discovery that another WTO member has been offering material support to Russ
39、ia. Evidence that military equipment or supplies had been provided to Russia for use in Ukraine would almost certainly generate calls for trade and other sanctions against the supplying party. Further fragmentation of the world trading system would ensue.Two other factors may reduce the likelihood o
40、f reactive fragmentation. The first is that the culpability of third-party governments may not be easy to establish, especially if, on the face of it, Russia was supplied with goods by a commercial firm where an export licence was not required. (A complicating factor arises if the supplying firm is
41、state-owned or state-linked.) The second factor is that the sanctioning nations would have to be willing to bear the economic costs of cutting commercial ties with the supplying nation. For many economies and firms, Russia was a relatively small market for their wares. This may not be the case for o
42、ther WTO members.Should a credible ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine be implemented, a pathway to rehabilitate Russia could be created. That is not to imply that the sanctions imposed by Western nations and their allies will be withdrawn any time soon, but the risk of further fragmentation of the
43、 world trading system would be markedly reduced. In a way, this highlights the degree to which the future of multilateral trade governance is a hostage to fortune in the ongoing conflict.Still, there may be an upside, however remote. Conceivably, trade diplomats could follow any ceasefire with initi
44、atives that demonstrate the role trade can play in encouraging comity possibly by making tangible progress in various ongoing big group trade negotiations, such as fisheries subsidies and digital trade. A more far-sighted option would be to build on Russias rehabilitation by exploring what enhanced
45、role the WTO could play in attenuating trade tensions in an era of growing geopolitical rivalry. If there is a heightened risk of clashes between nations with different economic and governance systems, in the language of the late Cold War era, what “interface mechanisms” could be developed to discou
46、rage localized trade policy disputes from mushrooming?101.2 Scenario 2: Rehabilitation, eventually1.4 Scenario 4: Depth between alliesThe working assumption underpinning this scenario is that incentives for political and economic liberalization need to be created without openly breaking with the gua
47、rantees of minimum treatment assured by WTO accords (MFN rights). This can be accomplished through deeper integration among economies of allies that hold the same views on governance matters. Such integration will make apparent the relative inferiority of MFN treatment and so may encourage governmen
48、ts to overcome previous reluctance to reform, or so the logic goes. While deeper integration need not be in the form of a binding regional trade agreement, a prerequisite for this scenario to move forward is that the allies are willing to act to reform and integrate their economies. Moreover, the wi
49、llingness to embark on reform will be attenuated if it is thought that an ally in the group may, in the future, elect a populist leader who scraps the plans for deeper integration. Still, such integration could include steps to develop common rules for the digital economy, common approaches to tackl
50、ing climate change (including the creation of “climate clubs”) and alignment on regulation and its enforcement, as well as the traditional staples of market access for goods, investment and services.Conflict, Sanctions and the Future of World Trade61.5 Scenario 5: Beggar non-alliesThe trigger for th
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