1、Platos ParmenidesIn honor of beloved Virgil“O degli altri poeti onore e lume . . .”Dante, InfernoThe Joan Palevsky Imprint in Classical LiteraturePlatos ParmenidesTRANSLATED WITH INTRODUCTION AND COMMENTARY BYSamuel ScolnicovUNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESSBerkeleyLos AngelesLondonThe publisher gratef
2、ully acknowledges the generouscontribution to this book provided by Joan Palevsky.University of California Press Berkeley and Los Angeles, CaliforniaUniversity of California Press, Ltd. London, England 2003 by the Regents of the University of CaliforniaLibrary of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication D
3、ataPlato.Parmenides. EnglishPlatos Parmenides / translated with introduction and commentary by Samuel Scolnicov. p. cm.Includes bibliographical references (p.) and indexes.ISBN 0-520-22403-5 (cloth: alk. paper)1. Socrates. 2. Parmenides. 3. Zeno, of Elea. 4. OntologyEarly works to 1800. 5. Reasoning
4、Early works to 1800. 6. DialecticEarly works to 1800. 7. Plato. Parmenides. I. Scolnicov, Samuel. II. Title.B378.A5 S3613 2001184dc2100-021808Manufactured in the United States of America987654321010987654321The paper used in this publication meets the minimum require-ments of ANSI / NISO Z39 0.48-19
5、92(R 1997) (Permanence of Paper).8contentslist of tables and figures/viiabbreviations/ixacknowledgments/xiIntroduction/1Plato Versus Parmenides/1The Problem of Method/3Elenchus/6Aporia and Euporia/8The Method of Hypothesis/9Two Principles of Noncontradiction/12The Verb to be/16Parmenidean Being and
6、Platonic Being/18The Dialogue/22A Note on the Translation/39parmenidesProem/43The Frame Story/43The Problem: The Many Cannot Be/45The Thesis: Forms Participate in Each Other, and Sensible Things Participate in Forms/48Part I: Aporia/53The Dilemma/55The Necessity of Positing Forms/73The Method/74Part
7、 II: Euporia/79Hypothesis: The One Is/80Argument I/80Argument II/94Argument III/139Argument IV/144Hypothesis: The One Is Not/147Argument V/147Argument VI/157Argument VII/159Argument VIII/163General Conclusion/166bibliography/167index locorum/175index nominum/183index of greek words and expressions/1
8、87general index/189vicontentstables and figuresTABLES1. The sequence of the Theorems and their categories in Part II of PlatosParmenides/302. Parallel categories in the Theorems in Part II of Platos Parmenides andin the poem of Parmenides, fragment 28 B 8 DK/33FIGURES1. The structure of the argument
9、s in Part I of Platos Parmenides/242. The structure of the Arguments in Part II of Platos Parmenides/283. The categories of being and their relations in Part II of Platos Parmenides/32viiabbreviationsIn this volume, fragments of the poem of Parmenides are cited as they ap-pear in the edition of Diel
10、s and Kranz (1951), volume 1, number 28, sec-tion B. The other works cited in abbreviated form in the text and notes arelisted immediately below.DKHermann Diels and Walther Kranz, eds., Die Fragmente der Vor-sokratiker, 6th ed., 3 vols. Berlin: Weidmann, 1951.LSJH. G. Liddell and R. Scott, eds., A G
11、reek-English Lexicon, 9th ed., rev.H. S. Jones. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940.ixacknowledgmentsThis book has been a long time in the making. It resulted from a growingawareness, over almost twenty years, of the importance of the Parmenides forthe understanding of Platos mature metaphysics and of the
12、 gradual real-ization that nothing short of a line-by-line commentary could do justice toits intricacies and its far-reaching implications.I have discussed the approaches and ideas developed in this book withmany more people than I can hope to thank adequately. Some, however, de-serve special mentio
13、n. I am, first of all, indebted to my students and my col-leagues over the years in seminars at the Universities of Jerusalem, Catania,Padua, Toronto, Irvine, and Paris-I for testing with me the interpretationsadvanced. To those from the Cambridge B-Club and Monique Dixsauts sem-inar at Paris-XII, I
14、 am thankful for healthy skepticism. To Denis OBrien andRosamond Kent Sprague I am grateful for their encouragement and for hav-ing read one of the final versions of this book, questioning points I too read-ily took for granted. At the University of California Press, Paul Psoinos went through the ma
15、n-uscript with a fine-toothed comb, improving the English style, keeping aneye on the accuracy of the translation, and copy-editing the book in painstak-ing detail. This book is much better for his efforts. Cindy Fulton and KateToll were responsible for its production, which proved sometimes to be q
16、uiteintricate, always ready in the best of spirits to help with their experience andenthusiasm. Many errors and oversights no doubt remain. For those, I must take fullresponsibility.Paris, May 2002xiJ.A. Palmers book, Platos Reception of Parmenides (Oxford: Clarendon Press,1999) came to my attention
17、 when this book was already in press, and so Ihave not been able to take full account of it, as it deserves. However, in thepresent book, I am less concerned than Palmer with Platos reception of Par-menides. As will become clear, I acknowledge Platos debt to Parmenides, asPalmer does, but I see Plat
18、os main aim in the Parmenides as to clarify his ownmetaphysical standpoint in opposition to Parmenides and improve on himwhile, at the same time, stressing the absolute necessity of Parmenides con-ception of being for any non-nominalistic metaphysics and epistemology.xiiacknowledgmentsIntroductionTo
19、ute interprtation du dialogue qui laissera spares les deux parties de loeuvre nepourrait nous satisfaire.wahl (1951), 8PLATO VERSUS PARMENIDESOf all Platos dialogues, the Parmenides is notoriously the most difficult to in-terpret. Scholars of all periods have violently disagreed about its very aimsa
20、nd subject matter. The interpretations have ranged from reading the dia-logue as an introduction to the whole of Platonicand more often Neo-platonicmetaphysics1to viewing it as a record of unsolved (and perhapsunsolvable) “honest perplexities,”2as protreptic “mental gymnastics,”3as acollection of so
21、phistic tricks,4or even as an elaborate (though admittedlytedious) joke.5Part I of the dialogue and especially the Third Man Argument have nodoubt received more than their fair share of effort and ingenuity. Duringthe last forty-odd years, the Third Man Argument has undergone detailedscrutiny by log
22、icians, philosophers, classicists, and, in general, anyone whofelt any connection with the subject, however distant. But while fine logicaltools have been used to interpret the Theaetetus and the Sophist with impor-tant and interesting results, the Parmenides as a whole seems to have been,11. For a
23、summary of Neoplatonic interpretations, see Dodds (1928), Wundt (1935). Theesotericist interpretation (e.g., Migliori 1990), influenced by Krmer, can be seen as a variantof this trend. In the same vein, Sguy-Duclot (1998) interprets the dialogue as pointing beyonditself, to higher levels, up to a he
24、nological point of view above ontology.2. Vlastos (1965b 1954), 145.3. Grote (1875), III, chap. 27; Peck (195354); cf. Kutschera (1995). See also Wilamowitz(1948), I 402; most recently Gill, “Introduction,” in Gill and Ryan (1996). Klibansky (1943: 28n. 1) attributes such a view already to Alcinous
25、(Albinus), possibly on the strength of chaps. 5and 6 of his Didaskalikos.4. E.g., Owen (1986 1970).5. Cf., e.g., Taylor (1934), 29.until quite recently, rather neglected. Gilbert Ryles renewed suggestion thatParts I and II of the dialogue are only loosely connected (and were proba-bly composed at di
26、fferent times) is perhaps not always explicitly accepted,but until recently it has with few exceptions been as a rule tacitly assumed,especially in the English-language literature, at least for practical purposes.6In this dialogue, Plato directly engages Parmenides, the most serious chal-lenge to hi
27、s own philosophy.7Platos interest in Parmenides is not new. Fromthe beginning, his forms were meant to meet the requirements of Par-menidean being.8Plato himself had reservations about Parmenides methodand doctrine, mainly in connection with his own doctrine of participation.9But never before had Pl
28、ato confronted Parmenidean philosophy so directlyand at such depth. From a Parmenidean point of view, there is no room forthe most basic of Platos ontological concepts: the concept of mevqexi, par-ticipation.10Unless a comprehensive alternative is offered to Parmenideslogic and ontology, participati
29、on will remain unintelligible, and the Platonicphilosophical program will be nothing short of incoherent.In the Parmenides, Plato reexamines his doctrine of forms and participa-tion as developed in his central metaphysical dialogues, the Phaedo, the Sym-posium, and the Republic, and provides it with
30、 a rigorous logical foundation.Part I of the dialogue is an examination of the concept of mevqexifrom anEleatic point of view. According to the Parmenidean view (or Platos versionof it), being does not admit of distinctions. Even if there could be two on-tological domains, or two types of entities,
31、a relation straddling them both,like mevqexi, would still be impossible. In Part II, Plato distinguishes betweentwo modes of being, provides an extensive analysis of each, dissolves the apo-2introduction6. See Apelt (1919); Wundt (1935); Ryle (1965), 145; cf. also Thesleff (1982). But the tidemay be
32、 turning: see, e.g., Miller (1986); Meinwald (1991); Gill, “Introduction,” in Gill and Ryan(1996); Turnbull (1998). For summaries of previous interpretations, see Runciman (19651959), 16776; Niewhner (1971); Migliori (1990).7. Calogero (1932) recognized the anti-Eleatic nature of the dialogue but re
33、ad it as an iron-ical reductio ad absurdum of the “eleatismo megarico . . . di paternit zenoniana” in the mannerof Gorgiass Peri; tou mh; onto.8. Parmenides influence on Plato has been recognized since Antiquity: e.g., by Proclusin his commentary on the dialogue. See also Zeller (1876), 148 f. The q
34、uestion whether Par-menides held that to; ejovnis one in the sense that there exists only one thing (Mourelatos 1970,130 ff.; Curd 1991) is irrelevant at this point. It is enough that Plato accepted that, at leastfor certain purposes, each of the forms must satisfy the restrictions that Parmenides i
35、mposedon his ejovn.9. Cf., e.g., Phaedo 100c46. See also below, pp. 1216, on the Principle of Noncontradic-tion, and pp. 36, on method.10. Throughout this volume, single quotation marks are used to indicate translations,glosses, concepts, hypotheses, and words as such. Double quotation marks are use
36、d for directquotations and as so-called scare quotes; and language adopted from the translation, but nottaken directly from it, is also shown within double quotation marks.riae of Part I, and prepares the ground for the metaphysics of the Sophist. Byhis own admission, Plato may have murdered “our fa
37、ther Parmenides” onlyin the Sophist,11but the weapon of the crime was already cocked and pointedin the Parmenides.On this interpretation, the Parmenidesdoes indeed occupya central place in the development of Platos late ontology, though not as aturning point.12An examination of the overall strategy
38、of the Parmenides shows that thetwo parts of the dialogue form a coherent and integrated whole, in whichPart II lays the foundation for an alternative to Eleatic ontology and method-ology, thus providing what Plato considers to be an adequate answer to thedilemma construed by Parmenides in Part I of
39、 the dialogue. It will turn out,however, that Plato thought that his conception of mevqexias being quali-fiedly cannot totally supplant but can only complement the Parmenideanconception of being absolutely.13Such an interpretation of the dialogue permits a unified and economi-cal explication of its
40、eight Arguments and the Appendix on participation intime, without being purely formal,14and without losing the wealth of possi-ble metaphysical overtones.15The interpretation relies on an analysis of theantithetical structure of the dialogue. But this antithetical structure will notprevent ontologic
41、al considerations about degrees of reality and modes ofbeing from playing a central role in the argument. Much to the contrary, itis precisely the examination of this structure that leads to the detection ofthe contrast between, as well as the contiguity of, the two modes of beingthat Plato explores
42、 in this dialogue.THE PROBLEM OF METHODPlato opposes Parmenides not only in regard to metaphysics, in a technicalsense, but also, perhaps mainly, in regard to the method and aims of philo-introduction311. Sophist 241d27.12. As claimed by de Vogel (1936); for a review, see Cherniss (1938).13. I have
43、proposed this view in Scolnicov (1984) and (1995).14. As, e.g., Brumbaugh (1961). Note that in the present volume the term Argument (cap-italized) is used to designate each of the eight argumentative sections, and their subsections,in Part II of the dialogue (improperly called Hypotheses since Antiq
44、uity). The term argu-ment (lowercase) refers to a complete train of reasoning, of any nature. Similarly, I use theterm Hypothesis (capitalized) to designate each of the two main propositions examined inPart II (each in its turn divided into four Arguments), in accordance with the method that Par-men
45、ides proposes at the end of Part I, viz. The one is and The one is not. The term hypoth-esis (lowercase) refers to any proposition put forth for examination, as per Platos method ofhypothesis, explained in the next section.15. E.g., as developed by Lynch (1959) and other interpreters of Neoplatonic
46、inspiration,ancient and modern.sophical argumentation. Such disagreement is not new with Plato, but onlyin this dialogue is it brought out in the open in all its depth and breadth.Parmenides may be said to be the first Cartesian philosopher. He is thefirst to tackle the problem of method and to make
47、 truth dependent on it.He does so explicitly: witness his insistence on oJdov, the way, and on thepath that leads to truth.16And he is Cartesian also in the method he favors:an absolutely certain, undeniable, primordial intuition is attained, and con-sequences are deduced from it. That fundamental r
48、ational intuition takesabsolute priority over common perception, and truth is to be reconstructedfrom it according to strict rules of procedure. Even if Parmenides methodis not Descartess in its details, still, like Descartes, the Eleatic philosopherreaches his conclusions starting from a premise co
49、nsidered as self-evidentand as taking precedence over any other proposition one could entertain.The certainty of the conclusions is guaranteed by the certainty of this pri-mary intuition (and also, of course, by the soundness of the procedure; but,as we shall see presently, the content of that intui
50、tion is intimately bound upwith the method itself). No conclusion can be more certain than thepremises from which it derives, and nothing is independently certain exceptthe basic premise.Parmenides intuition is basically formal. As Kurt von Fritz has shown inhis classic article, novois the faculty o
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