中国互联网行业发展态势暨景气指数报告.pdf
《中国互联网行业发展态势暨景气指数报告.pdf》由会员分享,可在线阅读,更多相关《中国互联网行业发展态势暨景气指数报告.pdf(46页珍藏版)》请在文库网上搜索。
1、firms operating in the US, the elasticity of substitution across material inputs was estimated to be only 0.2 in the short run. Most of the existing literature on natural disasters focuses on how GVCs transmit shocks, domestically (Carvalho et al., 2016) or internationally (Boehm et al., 2019).3 In
2、this paper, we study instead the longer- 2 For an analysis of the long-term evolution of global value chains, see Constantinescu et al. (2020) and World Bank (2020). 3 An exception is Zhu et al. (2016) which uses Japanese firm-level data from 2010-2013, to show that the earthquake increased manufact
3、uring offshoring from Japan among firms in the prefectures most affected by the disaster. 3 term impact of the 2011 earthquake in Japan on trade patterns. We focus on the automobile and electronics industries, for which Japan is a key supplier, especially of parts and components. For instance, as th
4、e shock severely affected production of Japanese automotive equipment, it had cascading effects on global auto producers such as Honda, Opel, Nissan, and General Motors which froze production lines in several factories worldwide (Automotive News, 2011). In electronics, the problems were similar, as
5、many specialized inputs such as connectors, microphones, and sensors were produced in Japan and had few or no substitutes (World Bank, 2020). To motivate the analysis, we identify certain patterns in the data. We examine imports of auto and electronics in the 15 largest auto producing countries as o
6、f 2010 and in the 15 largest exporters of final electronics products to gauge the longer term effect of the earthquake on suppliers.4 The left panel of Figure 1 shows the average shares of products imported from Japan for importers where Japan is not a prominent supplier (less than 15 percent of tot
7、al imports of that product by the country). The right panel focuses on importers largely dependent on Japanese suppliers (more than 15 percent of total imports in a product line). The figure shows that reliance on Japan dropped sharply following the 2011 earthquake for the countries most dependent o
8、n Japan. The drop was more than 10 percentage points for the auto industry, while in the case of electronics the earthquake appeared to accelerate pre-existing declining trends. This is prima facie evidence that large shocks do lead to a partial reconfiguration of supply chains: while less exposed i
9、mporters return to near pre-crisis operations after the shock, it is the more dependent producers that tend to change production structures. 4 See Table A1 in the Appendix for the list of countries. While we have data for automobile production by countries, we do not have similar data for electronic
10、s and therefore rely on export data. 4 Figure 1: Country share of imports from Japan in auto and electronics (average) Source: 6-digit HS 1988/92 import data from United Nations Comtrade. Notes: The figures plot Japans average market share for auto and electronics for country-products in which Japan
11、 had an average market share below 15 percent (left panel “Low Share”) and in country-products in which Japan had an average market share greater than 15 percent (right panel “High Share”) calculated over the 2004-2010 period. The sample for auto is restricted to the 15 largest auto producers and fo
12、r electronics to the 15 largest exporters of final electronics; in both cases Japan is excluded. The analysis relies on a simple identification strategy. We use detailed international trade data for automobile and electronics components and final goods to study whether in the aftermath of the 2011 e
13、arthquake, importers more dependent on Japan before the earthquake behaved differently from importers less dependent on Japan. Apart from the change in imports from Japan, we also investigate whether the 2011 earthquake led to a diversification of imports away from Japan and to reshoring or nearshor
14、ing of production by more dependent importers. We find that the earthquake led to a sharp decline in imports from Japan of auto parts and finished vehicles of countries more dependent on Japan before the shock. Electronics shows a similar pattern to the auto industry, but the decline was less pronou
15、nced. For both auto and electronics, intermediate imports were less affected than final imports. Using a continuous measure of dependence, we find that 5 the decline in imports for both auto and electronics is more severe the higher the importers dependence on Japanese suppliers in the period preced
16、ing the earthquake. We find, somewhat surprisingly, that importers more exposed to Japan before the 2011 earthquake did not increase import diversification in either auto or electronics. There is also no evidence that countries re-shored production. In fact, importers more exposed to Japan before th
17、e 2011 earthquake increased total imports, which is consistent with an intensification of offshoring rather than reshoring. An important question relates to which countries picked up the slack as supply chains reorganized in the aftermath of the 2011 earthquake. We perform a difference-in-difference
18、s analysis, comparing shifts in trade patterns of high Japan-dependent products with other products while controlling for importer and product specific time-varying shocks. We find that in the years following the shock, production relocation decisions were largely driven by fundamentals rather than
19、policy. Developing countries, rather than top exporters, were the primary beneficiaries and production tended to relocate in larger countries. There is no evidence that supply chains were increasingly regionalized or that importers sought nearby suppliers, except for final autos where transport cost
20、s are especially high. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a simple framework to think of the effects of natural disasters and the reshaping of supply chains. Section 3 studies the impact of the Japanese earthquake on the reconfiguration of supply chains. Section 4 take
21、s a closer look at where production moved after the shock. Section 5 concludes. 2. Natural disasters and supply chain reconfiguration To guide the empirical analysis, we propose a simple framework to think of the impact of natural disasters on the reconfiguration of supply chains. To begin with, con
22、sider the choice from the perspective of a multinational firm that imports from a subsidiary located in Japan.5 A disaster that destroys fixed assets like factories will accelerate the reallocation of production to production hubs where average costs are lower. Note that in normal circumstances, a f
23、irm would move to another location if the sum of the cost and insurance savings in the new location were larger than the fixed costs of relocation. Specifically, we 5 As noted in the introduction, Boehm et al. (2019) found that Japanese multinationals abroad lost access to auto intermediates and exp
- 配套讲稿:
如PPT文件的首页显示word图标,表示该PPT已包含配套word讲稿。双击word图标可打开word文档。
- 特殊限制:
部分文档作品中含有的国旗、国徽等图片,仅作为作品整体效果示例展示,禁止商用。设计者仅对作品中独创性部分享有著作权。
- 关 键 词:
- 中国 互联网 行业 发展 态势 景气 指数 报告